Scarcity and Slack

The housing crisis is a mismatch of price, product, and place—and consumers already know it. 

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For a decade, the American housing debate has run on a single word: more. Build more, and prices fall. Build more, and the crisis eases. It is a satisfying story, because it names a shortage, and shortages have obvious remedies. But the numbers coming in for 2026 complicate that story in a way we can no longer wave off, because the market is now doing something a simple shortage does not do.

Harvard's Joint Center for Housing Studies 2026 State of the Nation's Housing report describes a market showing scarcity and slack at the same time. Existing home sales are stuck near four million a year, a thirty-year low, down from 6.1 million as recently as 2021. Household formation has slowed for three consecutive years. Rental vacancies have climbed from 5.9 percent to 7.3 percent, and for-sale vacancies are rising alongside them. Homeownership has slipped for the second year running.

If this were a straightforward case of too few homes, none of that would be happening at once. A market genuinely starved of housing does not freeze and soften in the same breath. What we have instead is a mismatch.

The insight is not original to America. Writing recently about Australia, climate adaptation architect Digby Hall argued that his country never had a shortage of structures so much as a system of incentives that distributes them badly—one that finds it easier to sprawl outward than to house people well, resulting in empty bedrooms and unmet need. The particulars differ in the U.S., but the diagnosis applies: our crisis, too, is less about the raw count of dwellings than about which homes we build, where we put them, what they cost to run, and who can actually afford them.

Consumers feel this acutely. In a recent COGNITION Smart Data survey focused on affordability, when respondents were asked to name the biggest obstacles keeping them from buying, they pointed overwhelmingly at cost: high home prices (62 percent), difficulty saving for a down payment (47 percent), interest rates (43 percent), insufficient income (40 percent), and the rising burden of insurance and property taxes (37 percent). Only about one in six named a lack of homes available to buy.

Homeownership isn’t being thwarted by a shortage of buildings. Rather, it’s being impeded by an impenetrable wall of cost. Consider how many directions that mismatch runs at once.

It is a mismatch of price. The median new home now costs over $400,000, a 54 percent jump since 2020, and nearly five times median household income (compared to a historical norm closer to 3x.) With interest rates above 6 percent, the monthly payment on a median-priced home has risen from roughly $1,700 in early 2020 to about $3,100 at the end of last year, and the income required to carry it has nearly doubled, from around $66,000 to more than $120,000. We did not merely raise prices. We relocated the threshold of ownership beyond the reach of the middle class that housing policy claims to serve.

It is a mismatch of buyer. The homes we build and hold are still pitched at a move-up buyer who is increasingly staying put or priced out entirely. First-time buyers now make up just 21 percent of the market, with a median age of 40. The starter home has quietly stopped functioning as a rung on a ladder towards creating generational wealth.

Meanwhile, Boomers who bought decades ago, when homes cost a fraction of today's prices, report that roughly a third would be very unlikely to afford their own homes in the current market, locking up the very entry-level stock younger generations need to get into the housing market.

The freeze shows up even among people who already own: in the COGNITION affordability survey, more than a quarter of current owners said they'd be unlikely to buy their own home again at today's prices and rates, and nearly half said prices are simply too high to justify moving or upgrading at all. The result is a market where the people who can't afford to move up and the people who won't move at all are jammed against each other, and nobody moves.


COGNITION data shows that nearly 40% of U.S. buyers today believe they can only afford a home that is priced under $300,000, which is $120,000 less than the median price of an existing home of $420,000.

It is a mismatch of product. We keep optimizing for size at the precise moment buyers are optimizing away from it. COGNITION data shows the share of consumers who say they want a smaller home rose from 28 to 38 percent in a single year, while appetite for larger homes has stayed persistently low. And people are ready to make the trade: in the affordability survey, 87 percent said they would accept a smaller home in order to own sooner, with four in ten willing to go a full 25 percent below the typical new-home footprint.

When asked what matters most in a home designed to lower long-term costs, they put energy efficiency (68 percent), an efficient, optimized layout (57 percent), and smaller size itself (50 percent) at the top of the list, ahead of nearly everything else.

COGNITION data shows that energy efficiency, efficient layouts, and smaller home sizes are top priorities to reduce ongoing operating costs.

Buyers have already made the turn toward right-sized, low-operating-cost homes, yet the industry is still handing them square footage. It is not a small gap to close: a new, efficient home saves its owner an estimated $25,000 over its first decade compared with a similar twenty-year-old house—real money that never shows up on an MLS listing.

And at the bottom of the market, the mismatch stops being an inconvenience and becomes deprivation. According to the Harvard report, over the past decade, the number of units renting for under $1,000 fell by seven million. Affordable ownership inventory for households earning $75,000 or less dropped 60 percent since 2019. Eleven million extremely low-income renters now compete for 3.8 million homes they can actually afford—a shortfall of 7.2 million units. Among renters earning under $30,000, 83 percent are cost-burdened and two-thirds spend more than half of everything they earn on housing. After the rent is paid, the typical household in that group is left with a median of $210 a month for food, medicine, transportation, and every other cost of being alive, down from $410 in 2019. That is what a mismatch looks like when it reaches the people with no margin to absorb it.

So why does the industry keep making the same error? Because the current price per square foot, lowest upfront cost valuation metric rewards it. Building large, higher-margin, move-up homes on inexpensive land at the edge of urban and suburban areas continues to be the path of least resistance, especially when developers, land holders, and investors treat shelter as a yield product.

The harder, more useful work—infill, office-to-residential conversion, right-sized homes, missing-middle density in the places people actually want to live—collides with zoning, financing, valuation, and appraisal systems calibrated for the pattern we already have. It’s ironic, really–we spend our vacations in places like Charleston and Georgetown and Boston's North End, admiring exactly the kind of walkable density we have made illegal to build back home.

None of this is an argument against building. We need more homes, urgently. But, more of what, priced how, for whom, and at what cost to operate, are the questions that determine whether new supply relieves the crisis or merely repeats it at greater scale. The levers that answer them—appraisal standards, underwriting guidelines, the fields in an MLS listing, local zoning and incentives—are within reach, and most of them move at the local and regional level, which is to say faster than Washington ever will.

Encouragingly, some are already moving. Harvard notes a wave of state action unwinding the rules that entrench the mismatch: legalizing accessory dwelling units, permitting manufactured homes, allowing multifamily in commercial zones, letting single-stair midrise buildings pencil out again. Each is, quietly, a distribution fix, a way to put more of the right homes where people need them, rather than more of the wrong ones where land happens to be cheap.

This is where Value Per Square Foot comes in—not as a slogan or gimmick, but as a market correction. The mismatch is, at root, a measurement problem: we price homes by size and upfront cost, so size and upfront cost are what the market delivers.

The instinct to measure differently is already there in the public mindset. When asked in the affordability survey whether a home with a slightly higher purchase price but a lower total monthly cost (principal, interest, insurance, utilities, and maintenance combined) would count as more affordable, 92 percent of consumers said yes or maybe. People already reason about what a home costs to live in, not just what it costs to buy. Our metrics simply don't. Change what we count—what a home costs to operate, how it holds up, how healthy it is, where it sits, how long it lasts—and the incentives finally start pointing toward the homes people actually want and can afford to live in.

We spent the last century equating a good home with a big one. The families with $210 left at the end of the month are the receipt for where that logic leads. The work now is to figure out how to value our built environment more accurately, to measure homes and communities by what they give back rather than by how much ground they cover.


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